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The second is the elief that the u i e se itself is su li e: so ethi g of i t i si alue a d o de (10). In fleshing out these claims, Dworkin covers a tremendous amount of terrain for such a short book. His discussion touches on epistemology, metaethics, theology, the philosophy of science, aesthetics, practical political philosophy and constitutional theory, and all in his characteristically engaging style. Inevitably, in places his analysis is terse (he is to be forgiven here, since his work was cut short by the illness that would lead to his death), and readers with a special interest in any of the topi s o e ed a feel f ust ated that D o ki has ot p o ided o e detail. Yet D o ki s p i ipal aim with the book is not to win particular philosophical battles, but to present a world-view, a way of thinking about life, the universe, and, well, everything. In that regard he succeeds in style, and he gives us plenty to think about along the way. I hapte o e D o ki li ks eligious atheis to his metaethical position, which he calls u g ou ded ealis . D o ki eje ts all fo s of atu alis : theo ies that lai othi g is eal other than that which can be studied by the natural sciences. But he also rejects the strong realist ie g ou ded ealis , as he alls it that e a ha e pe eptual o ta t ith o al t uth. The o l easo e ha e fo elie i g i o al o je ti it is, fo D o ki , that e efle t espo si l o ou o al o i tio s a d fi d the pe suasi e . Thus, o fidence in a particular moral judgment elies o its ohe e e ith e e thi g else e elie e. If that sou ds i ula , it s e ause it is. But the e is o fi all o i ula a to e tif ou apa it to fi d t uth of a ki d i a i telle tual domain . The assu ptio s a out ausatio upo hi h s ie tifi e pe i e ts el a ot e verified independently of such experiments, and we cannot demonstrate the axioms of mathematics by any non-mathematical method (16) (17) . We have no way of setting aside all of our convictions to hold a pa ti ula p opositio to the light. To i oke the i age of Neu ath, ade fa ous D o ki s old teacher Quine, we are like sailors forced to rebuild our boat at sea.
The Book in Outline
We a e thus left ith o fou datio othe tha felt, i es apa le o i tio , o , to put it a othe a , faith
. Ne e theless, the a alog et ee elief i o je ti e alue a d faith i God ight see i ade uate to ake the fo e ualif as eligious . Afte all, is t the e a ele a t distinction to be made between those who believe God is the source of objective value, and those who do not? Not so, says Dworkin. He makes his case by delineating two aspects of theistic religions: the s ie e pa t a d the alue pa t -4). The science part offers answers to factual questions, including the existence of God. The value part offers convictions about how people should live. Now the disti tio et ee the s ie e pa t a d the alue pa t is a disti tio et ee is a d ought and so, argues Dworki , Hu e s la applies. We a ot de i e o ati e-evaluative conclusions from purely descriptive propositions about the existence of God:
A God s e iste e o ha a te a figu e i the defe se of su h alues o l as a fa t that makes some different, independent background value judgment pertinent; it can figure only, that is, as a i o p e ise… o e a ot suppo t a alue judg e t… just esta lishi g so e s ie tifi fa t a out ho the o ld is o as o ill e.
The second chapter deals directl ith the se o d aspe t of D o ki s eligious attitude: the elief that the universe is objectively beautiful. Dworkin cites Einstein, who felt equipped to describe himself as eligious , despite his atheis , a d "pi oza, a so-alled pa theist ho equated God with nature. The lai that atu e is eautiful is ot that atu e p odu es eautiful thi gs, ut athe that it is a source of eaut , e phasis added . I ha a te isti fashio , D o ki akes this poi t ith a appeal to our pre-existing convictions. We would not find the Grand Canyon wondrous if we discovered that it was man-ade, so the G a d Ca o a t just happe to e a eautiful thi g ade by nature; it is beautiful because it is natural. Of course, this appeal to intuition does not prove anything, but it must be enough to give even the most ardent naturalist pause for thought. Insofar as anyone might not be convinced, Dworkin seems content simply to leave them ehi d. If ou do t e pe ie e a se se of o de at the su li e, the ou just do t sha e D o ki s ie poi t. D o ki s positio he e is esse tiall the sa e as it is ith ethi s: if ou e looki g fo p oof the ou e aski g the o g uestio . His lai that the u i e se is objectively beautiful might be more controversial than a claim about objective morality, since there are many people who accept moral truth while believing beauty to be simply a matter of taste. But think back to the example. If someone said, upon discovering that the Grand Canyon was man-made, that his wonder remained u di i ished, ould t e sa , ot o l that his taste as diffe e t to ou s, ut that he had so eho missed the point?
D o ki lai s that the idea of os i eaut should se e as a p esu ptio i ph si ists research, so that the scientific search for elegant unifying theories cannot be explained merely as a search for truth, but also as a search for beauty (64). He then asks: what kind of beauty could this be? His answer is that the universe is beautiful because it is inevitable. The beauty of the universe lies in the interconnectedness of everything i the ast ess of spa e a d i the i utiae of e iste e… so that othi g ould e diffe e t ithout the e ei g othi g . Just as the e is a se se i hi h ea h brushstroke, chord or sentence seems essential to a great work of art, so each of the laws of physics seem, at least to religious atheists, an indispensable part of physical reality as a whole. In chapter three, Dworkin is in more familiar political/legal philosopher mode, addressing the question of whether the guarantees of freedom of religion that exist in many constitutions should be limited to theistic opinions, or whether religious atheists should enjoy equal protection. He accepts that, fo ost people, eligio is restricted to theism (107-8), but those who are familiar with D o ki s legal iti gs ill k o that he does ot take legal i te p etatio to e a atte of i gi g out o o l sha ed u de sta di gs. It is a o ati e uestio : Ho ust e u de stand the concept of religion if we are to justify the assumption that freedom of religion is an important basic ight?
Dworkin grounds the right to religious freedom in a familiar liberal foundation: a government that prohibits people from respecting religious duties insults their dignity and self-respect (113). Yet atheists often have convictions of duty which are, for them, equally imperative (114). He therefore concludes that there is no reason why it should be wrong to take sides between orthodox theistic religions, but not between other types of views of what counts as living well (115) .
Rather than ground a right to religious freedom in a particular definition of religion, then, D o ki suggests that the ight is a i sta tiatio of the o e ge e al ight to ethi al i depe de e (132). Although this view supports most widely held liberal positions (it condemns official displays of religious insignia on public buildings, but protects the right of private citizens to wear religious dress; it o de s o pulso p a e i s hools, ut pe its adopti g a o e t of sile e fo uiet reflection; it forbids the teaching of creationism or intelligent design as an alternative to Darwinism), it has some consequences that we might find surprising. For example, Dworkin believes the US Supreme Court was right to decide in Oregon v Smith (494 US 872 (1990) ) that Native American peyote smokers were not entitled to an exemption from drug laws on the ground that peyote plays a role in thei eligious ituals. To fi d othe ise, he sa s, ould e to dis i i ate agai st s epti al hippies ho just a t to get high .
In the final chapter Dworkin addresses perhaps the most difficult subject of all: death. Religious atheism turns out to have a sort of godless afterlife; though nothing like the heaven of traditional religions. Athiestic immortality does ot i ol e li i g fo e e , ot o Ol pus o e e i a apa t e t . But the alue of a life ell li ed a ot e dest o ed. If e li e ell, e a hie e a fo of i o talit . That is a eligious o i tio if a thi g is.
I cannot possibly hope to comment on all of the arguments Dworkin raises in the bookit may be short in pages but it is certainly not short on ideas -a d hile the ook s ai lai , that a atheisti ie poi t ight e e theless a a t the title eligious , e tai ly deserves a prolonged discussion, as I find myself entirely persuaded by Dworkin on this front I am probably not the right person to attempt this. Instead I shall restrict myself mainly to elucidating what I see as central aspects of D o ki s thought, aking connections that are not explicit in the text, and suggesting directions i hi h D o ki s ideas ight e et fu the de eloped. That is ot to sa that I ha e othi g iti al to say about the book, and I shall conclude with some comments that pick a ua el ith D o ki s t eat e t of f eedo of eligio as a politi al a d o stitutio al ight.
Coherence and Responsibility
Cohe e e lea l pla s a huge ole i D o ki s philosoph . A o g la e s, D o ki is est k o for his theory of law as integrity, according to which we answer a legal problem by constructing an account of the various principles in play so that the entire legal system can be seen as a coherent hole. He is also, of ou se, a st o g ad o ate of the hedgehog thesis that e should think of our entire catalogue of values not as a miscellaneous and potentially contradictory list, but as a complex unity. Now we see that, for Dworkin, the very beauty of the universe lies in its integrity. Clearly, in none of these fields is coherence self-evident, or rationally demonstrable. Rather, across each domain we are enjoined to strive fo ohe e e. Whi h gi es ise to the halle ge e p essed iti al lawyers, value pluralists and sceptical physicists: why should we suppose that coherence is a hie a le? "hould t e just lea to a ept Natu e as "he is -a su d ? (Feynman 2006) One possibility is that we should strive for coherence because coherence is beautiful. On this view, physicists searching for a unified theory are embarking on a religious quest: it is their faith in cosmic beauty that drives them to seek coherence. This seems close to what Dworkin suggests when he talks about beauty guiding scientific research. But it does a poor job of explaining why we should seek coherence in morality or law. For although it might seem plausible that we ought to select the most elegant of competing scientific theories on aesthetic grounds, few would argue that it would be proper to resolve a moral dilemma, or make a court ruling, based on what one believed was most beautiful. 1 Why is wrong to resolve moral or legal questions on aesthetic grounds? A tempting answer is that it will simply lead us to make the wrong decisions. But this simply begs the question by presupposing that the right answer exists independently of aesthetic considerations. If the proper way to resolve dilemmas is to resort to aesthetic elegance, then the beautiful answer is the right answer.
Instead, I believe (and I think Dworkin also believed) that beauty cannot be the controlling value in the normative realm since this would amount to an evasion of responsibility. Deciding normative questions on aesthetic grounds shifts the issue onto a different ground entirely. In doing so we decline to deal with the dilemma that we are presented with; like an undergraduate struggling with an exam, instead of trying to tackle the question in front of us we give an answer to an easier one.
This poi ts us to a ds hat I elie e D o ki s eal a s e is. It is responsibility itself that requires that we suppose that coherence is achievable in our scientific, moral and legal practices. The (2011, 209) ) Responsibility requires that agents act with integrity, and that they treat important decisions with the gravity that they deserve. But in difficult cases we find that our convictions are disordered and our values vague and unhelpful. We might sense that diverse values pull us in different directions, so that there is no right answer to how we should act. For value pluralists, there is, sometimes at least, nothing more to say than this. For Dworkin, however, this sense is the startingpoint, not the conclusion. Responsibility requires that we try our best to ascertain what is required of us. The only way we can do this is by striving for coherence among our various moral convictions. Nevertheless, it might be argued, the fact that we have reason to strive for coherence does not mean that coherence is attainable. Is t it i espo si le to p esuppose that there is an ideal ohe e e of alues, he it ight tu out that the e is t? He e e eed to e o gua d fo the return of grounded realism. We cannot know that our values conflict, except through an argument that persuades us that that is so. Any such argument is going to be open to criticism. Similarly, s ie tists ould e e ha e a easo at all to suppose, at a poi t i the eo s of ph si s to o e, that they had actually reached the stopping point, that they were finally up against a all of ei d ess (80). Responsibility does not allow us to rest on our laurels and assume we have reached the end of intellectual history, but rather it requires that we accept that our theories are works in progress, open to further development and refinement. If so, then we will always view a conflict between values, or a s ie tifi all u e plai ed essi ess , as a sho t o i g i ou theo eti al appa atus i a t of a remedy. The concept of ideal coherence acts as a regulative idea to spur us on to continually improve our theories. We can accept it, responsibly, because we could never be in a position to know that we must reject it.
Beauty, Acceptability and Truth
Dworkin discusses, only to dismiss, the view held by Hawking that beauty is part of the definition of truth in science. Dworkin quotes a passage by Hawking that merits reproduction:
Whe … a [s ie tifi ] odel is su essful at e plai i g e e ts, e te d to att i ute to it, a d to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth. But there may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation, with each employing different fundamental elements and concepts. If two such physical theories or models accurately predict the same events, o e a ot e said to e o e eal tha the othe . (2010, 7) In this case, the fact that a model is beautiful is reason for us to accept it as true ahead of its less elegant rivals. D o ki s dis issal of this ie is, to i d, u ious. He ats it aside sa i g that ost ph si ists a e o ki g ealists , i.e. the elie e that the e is a o je ti e ealit that is independent of the beauty of that reality, and that when they say that the cosmos is beautiful, they a e aki g a d a ati lai a out ealit , ot e el a se a ti poi t a out the defi itio of t uth i s ie e . But does t this a gu e t el o ou a epti g, i the eal of s ie e, the g ou ded realis that D o ki ould ha e us eje t i the eal of o alit ? Ha ki g s a gu e t is o l a se a ti o e i the pejo ati e se se that D o ki i te ds if e take the defi itio of t uth i s ie e as so ethi g p io to s ie tifi i ui , i.e. as a ki d of foundational presupposition. Certainly if we determine in advance of scientific inquiry that the discovery of scientific truth involves the discovery of beauty, then Dworkin would be right to say that the subsequent discovery of beauty ould ot e a d a ati lai a out ealit . But if e a ept u g ou ded ealis , the su el e cannot view the definition of truth in science as insulated from the results of scientific inquiry. We have no Archimedean point on which to stand: each conviction we hold within a domain of inquiryincluding the standards for truth in that domainmust be sensitive to every other conviction. So the claim that beauty is part of the definition of truth in science can be as much of a conclusion from our scientific inquiry as it is a prerequisite for such inquiry. Dworkin says that scientists should not search for beauty as truth, but rather for beauty and t uth. He a epts Ha ki g s lai that, if ultiple odels a u atel p edi t the sa e e e ts, e ha e reason to accept the odel that is ost elega t; D o ki s ua el ith Ha ki g o e s hethe the elega e of the odel speaks to the odel s truth. In distinguishing between the acceptability of a theo a d the theo s t uth, D o ki see s to o it hi self to a o espondence theory according to which a scientific theory is true if it correctly describes reality. But what reason could we have for believing that there exists some external reality to which our scientific models correspond?
If the e is o fi all o ircular way to certify our capacity to find truth of any kind in any intellectual do ai ), should t D o ki also eje t the idea of a e te al eal of ph si al fa ts? If to sa that a moral theory is true is simply to say that we should accept it, then why does not the same apply to a scientific theory? I am not saying that it is necessarily incoherent to reject a correspondence theory of truth in the moral domain while accepting it in the scientific, but Dworkin does not give a proper explanation fo his doi g so. It see s to e that the logi of D o ki s etaethi s poi ts to a ds a epta e of Pei e s si ple fo ula that t uth is the e d of i ui , 2 so that to say that science should aim at the discovery of beauty is to say that beauty is part of the definition of truth, ot i a edu ti e o se a ti se se, ut athe i the falli ilisti se se that the u e t state of ou scientific knowledge justifies the presumption that scientific inquiry ought to aim at the discovery of eaut . O Pei e s a ou t of t uth, at least, Ha ki g s a d D o ki s positio s see to a ou t to the same thing.
Global Discourse

Beauty, Coherence and Personification
Dworkin locates the beauty of the universe in its inevitability, which he links with the shielded strong i teg it of the la s of ph si s: easo s… emerge from the theory itself showing that the idea of prior e pla atio a ot a ise e ause it akes o se se . This, D o ki lai s, ea s that the universe is beautiful in a deeper sense than would be the case if nature just happened to make eautiful thi gs, i hi h ase the u i e se ould e eautiful e e oi ide e . But if ou focus is only on the inevitability of the physical realm, then we are only looking at half the puzzle. To say that it is inevitable that the universe is the way that it is is not quite the same as saying that it is inevitably beautiful. For although we may find beauty in its inevitability, it does not follow that it is inevitable that e fi d eaut i i e ita ilit . It ould still e o l a oi ide e that e fi d inevitability beautiful. In order for the universe to be beautiful in a truly non-contingent way, both the physical realm and the beauty of the universe need shielded strong integrity. What could give cosmic aesthetics such integrity? Religious theists have a straightforward answer: human beings were deliberately created in such a way that they can perceive the inherently beautiful divine order. Their sense of cosmic beauty is no coincidence: the same intelligence that created the beautiful universe also created human beings, as part of that universe, so that they could perceive such beauty. But this argument is not open to the religious atheist, who must concede that people s se se of eaut is the esult of a evolutionary process, and socio-historical factors, that were not purposively set in order and thus seem to be, in a sense, contingent. 3 Dworkin does not address the question of why inevitability is beautiful, he merely takes it as a fact that we tend to consider it so. He gives us no reason to believe cosmic aesthetics has shielded strong integrity. However, I believe that a potential argument (I put it no higher than that) can be identified by considering a a alog ith D o ki s a gu e t fo ohe e e i la . I La 's E pire, D o ki lai ed that the ohe e e o i teg it of the la is alua le e ause it allo s the legal community itself to be personified, i.e. portrayed as a moral agent with its own principles and ideals (1986, . By analogy, one could argue that the fundamental coherence of physical laws into one master theory enables the universe itself to be seen as if it were the product of a single agent. That we find this beautiful, the a gu e t goes, is ot a oi ide e , it follo s e essa il f o the ki d of beings that we are, i.e. purposive agents. We view nature as wondrous because we can view it as othe of all thi gs, e e if e eje t the idea that the e e ists a lite al other, or father, that created it. We view a coherent universe as analogous to a work of art because we see nature as a alogous to a a tist. O the othe ha d, e ould t ake this o e tio if e e e fo ed to a ept atu e as a su d : atu e ould e analogous not to Shakespeare but to a monkey with a typewriter. Of course, this line of reasoning comes close to a common argument for the existence of God, according to which the universe is such as can only be explained as the creation of an intelligent actor. Perhaps, thenand I stress here I am only speculating about a possible line of thoughtif the link between coherence and personification holds up, the connection between theism and religious atheism becomes closer still.
Religion and the Constitution D o ki s ie that t aditio al defi itio s of eligio e ui e the go e e t to hoose between itize s si e e o i tio s to de ide hi h a e o th of spe ial p ote tio see s to o e look a alternative: that when it comes to the significance of various convictions, the government refer to i di iduals' o ie s. Ca t go e e t ake disti tio s a o di g to i di iduals o sta da ds ithout o t adi t[i g] the asi p i iple that uestio s of fu da e tal alue a e a atte of individual, ot olle ti e, hoi e ? I iefl a t to suggest that a lose e a i atio of eligious ie s may cause trouble for the way Dworkin treats freedom of religion as a constitutional right.
D o ki s a gu e t that f eedo of eligio does ot a a t any particular constitutional protection per se relies heavily on the idea that the same kinds of value commitments can be found in atheistic religion as in theistic religion. But might a theist not argue that value commitments are qualitatively different by virtue of being linked to or derived from a god? Dworkin looks to sidestep this ki d of a gu e t his i o atio of Hu e s la : si e o ati e p opositio s a ot e de i ed f o pu e fa ts, a god s e iste e a featu e o l as a i o p e ise i a argument which already presupposes the possibility of value. But while this argument might be persuasive from some theists, fo othe s it ill just shift the field of disag ee e t. Afte all, hat akes Hu e s la so fu da e tal?
It represents, after all, a distinctively modern viewpoint, which would have been completely alien to ancients and medievals. Aristotle was characteristic of his time in viewing the cosmos as a meaningful order, pregnant with value in and of itself. Only in the modern viewpoint are subject and objectand thus ought a d isentirely separable entities. Is it inconceivable that some religious theists retain a version of the premodern view? My purpose here is not to attack the modernist position, but only to cast doubt on Dworki s assu ptio that the eal disag ee e t et ee theists a d atheists is o l a esote i ki d of s ie tifi disag ee e t ith o o al o politi al i pli atio s . Gi e his eje tio of u g ou ded ealis , D o ki su el a ot o side Hu e s la to be immune from criticism. 4 Dworkin also appears to overlook the distinction between those practices which are taken as religious obligations and those that are taken to be non-obligatory components of the good life. When we take this distinction into account, there is a clear difference between those engaging in Huichol rituals from curious hippies. Hippies might hold the view that their life is improved by their choosing to take hallucinogenic drugs. But many Huichol will not view their participation in religious rituals as a matter of choice. Rather, they will be what Sandel (1998) has alled e u e ed sel es : pe so s fo whom the observance of religious duties is an end constitutive to their selfhood, indispensable to their identity. Contra Dworkin, an exemption for the Huichol from drug control laws would not discriminate o eligious g ou ds agai st those ho o l a t to get high . 'athe it ould ake a distinction based on a real difference. Compliance with a perceived obligation is qualitatively different to aki g a si ple hoi e, e e if the hoi e is oti ated the hoose s si e e elief that it ill improve her objective well-being. This difference must be taken into account if we are to treat people as equals, rather than merely treating them equally. 5 (Of course, the hippies might also claim that peyote-smoking was not a choice but an obligation constitutive to their selfhood, in which case we would have to decide whether to believe them.) Now religious atheists may also doubt Hu e s la , a d ight also e e u e ed sel es. Thus my comments here do not cast doubt on the category of religious atheism. But I feel that attention as to the diversity of views that others actually hold makes the situation a little more complex than D o ki s oad ush o stitutio al a gu e ts suggest. D o ki is ight that theist views are not eo ipso worthy of special protection. But it does not necessarily follow that there is no useful constitutional category of the religious.
Conclusion
Religion without God is a profound and, ultimately, moving piece, p ese ted i D o ki s characteristically witty and engaging prose. While those looking for a rigorous treatment of competing arguments will find themselves disappointed, readers are treated to a fine exposition of a particular way of looking at the world. D o ki s a itio , lea l , is to p a ti e as he p ea hes: to eate out of a jumble of arguments and convictions a simple, elegant and persuasive unifying theory. Although D o ki s a i us is opti isti , e e o a ti , he continually subjects his convictions to rigorous analytical testing. He strives for, and often achieves, beauty in the particular as well as beauty in the whole. In the end, whether one is persuaded will depe d upo hethe o e sha es D o ki s faith.
That is, after all, what religion is about.
Notes
1. Though some have argued this, or at least something like this: see, for example, Rancière (2004) and Douzinas and Nead (1999) . I cannot do justice to views of this sort here. 2. See Misak (2004) . Interestingly, Misak has recently placed Quine in this pragmatist lineage (2013, chap 11) (I am grateful to Chris Macleod for this reference). 3. I sa i a se se o ti ge t, si e i the physical sense they are not contingent but predetermined by the laws of physics which are (arguendo at least) inevitable. The physical sense of inevitability cannot provide cosmic beauty with shielded strong integrity, since that would render the judgment that the universe was beautiful a non sequitur. It would amount to no more than saying that the universe was such as to make the presence of beings who believe it to be beautiful inevitable. This would be to destroy, not buttress, the objective (i.e. mind-independent) concept of aesthetics. 4. Co t ast Cohe , ho takes a pa ti ula l st o g e sio of Hu e s la to e i he e t i the sort of o ept that justi e is , 292), but who relies on an ultimately unsustainable Platonism about value. 5. The terminology for this distinction is from Dworkin (2013, 227) .
